Selection of author's works on Svātantrika Madhyamika philosophy and logic.

On correct method of understanding various Buddhist philosophical concepts according to sutras and tantras in accordance with Karmapa VIII Mi-bskyod-rdo-rje interpreation.

Annotations to the pedagogical exegesis of Mādhyamika philosophy.

The rationalist lover accepts that whom she ought to love is whom she has most reason to love. She also accepts that the qualities of a person are reasons to love them. This seems to suggest that if the rationalist lover encounters someone with better qualities than her beloved, then she is rationally required to trade up. In this paper, I argue that this need not be the case and the rationalist lover can have just about as normal if not (...) a better romantic life than anyone could hope for. This is because we often do possess most reason to love our beloveds. To see why this is so, we have to think more carefully about (i) how we come to possess reasons for love and (ii) the higher-order reasons that govern whether we should seek or refrain from possessing said reasons. Reflection on these issues leads to what I call the Possession-Commitment Account of Love’s Reasons. I use this account to address additional worries for love rationalism and highlight how being rational about love can potentially get us out of romantic messes. I conclude that if being a rationalist about love is plausible after all, then we have reason to hope that being rational about other areas of our practical lives is plausible as well. (shrink)

This is a comparative study of the discourses on the nature of sacred language found in Indian Abhidharma texts and those written by 7th century Chinese Buddhist scholars who, unlike the Indian Buddhists, questioned 'the essence of the Buddha's teaching'. This issue labeled fo-chiao t'i lun, the theory of 'the essence of the Buddha's teaching', was one of the topics on which Chinese Yogācāra scholars have shown a keen interest and served as the inspiration for extensive intellectual dialogues in their (...) texts. It is in Hsüan-tsang's massive and organized translation works, begun in 648, that various previous translations of the term buddhavacana from Indian Abhidharma texts were given the unified translation of fo-chiao. (Fo-chiao literally means "the Buddha's teachings," and is the term used in the modern period for "Buddhism.") By combining fo-chiao with the term t'i, meaning 'essence' or 'substance' throughout his translations, Hsüan-tsang attempted to define 'the essence of the Buddha's teaching'. In Indian Abhidharma texts, the nature of the Buddha's word was either 'sound' (abdha), the oral component of speech, or 'name' (nāma), the component of language that conveys meaning, or some combination of the two. From the time of Hsüan-tsang's translation, however, discourse on the nature of sacred language was no longer relegated to the category of language or of epistemological investigation, but became grounded in the Chinese discussion investigating the 'essence' or 'substance' of the Buddha's teaching, and even of 'Buddhism' itself. As such, it sought to transcend the distinction between language and meaning. This gradual but explicit process of inquiry into the nature of 'the Buddha's word' was a necessary antecedent to the transition to a 'Chinese' Buddhism. (shrink)

Unlike many commentators who tend to see Schweitzer's mission one-sidedly, I show the coexistence of liberal and conservative elements in his mission. While his mission intent was mostly motivated by the former, his mission practices largely show the latter. In this essay, I analyze them in detail in three parts. I first explain how such opposite elements can coexist by applying Dipesh Chakrabarty's notion of provincializing Europe. Like most nineteenth-century Western liberals, Schweitzer advocated Enlightenment rights for Europeans, but denied them (...) to the colonized. I then argue that Schweitzer's mission was motivated by the liberal elements of his theology. When his critical theology led him to deny the divinity of Jesus, he found a new basis for Christianity in Jesus? ethical activism, which led him to become a medical missionary to Africa. I then examine Schweitzer's conservative practices in Africa: by applying the developmental model of Hegelian-Marxist historicism to African society, Schweitzer opposed both decolonization and advanced learning to Africans. Schweitzer's missionary practices in Africa, I therefore conclude, were more conservative than those of the typical European missionary. (shrink)

I argue that the bishop of Hippo taught sola fide, declarative justification, and the divine acceptance of sinners based on faith alone although he presented these pre-Reformational thoughts with strong emphasis on the necessity of growth in holiness. Victorinus and Ambrosiaster already taught a Reformational doctrine of justification prior to Augustine in the fourthcentury Latin Christianity. Therefore, the argument that sola fide and justification as an event did not exist before the sixteenth-century Reformation, and these thoughts were foreign to Augustine (...) is not tenable. For Augustine, justification includes imputed righteousness by Christ’s work, which can be appreciated by faith alone and inherent righteousness assisted by the Holy Spirit at the same time of forgiveness in justification. Nonetheless, the sole ground of the divine acceptance does not depend on inherent righteousness, which is real and to increase. The salvation of the confessing thief and the remaining sinfulness of humanity after justification show Augustine that faith alone is the ground of God’s acceptance of sinners. Augustine’s relatively less frequent discussion of sola fide and declarative justification may be due to his need to reject the antinomian abusers who appealed to the Pauline understanding of justification even when they do not have any intentional commitment to holiness after their confessions. Augustine’s teaching on double righteousness shows considerable theological affinity with Bucer and Calvin who are accustomed to speak of justification in terms of double righteousness. Following Augustine, both Bucer and Calvin speak of the inseparability and simultaneity of justification and sanctification. Like Augustine, Bucer also maintains a conceptual, not categorical, distinction between the two graces of God in their doctrines of justification. (shrink)

Why have Korean Protestants been enthusiastic for Henri Nouwen, Thomas Merton, and Orthodox books in recent years? This article proposes that apophatic spirituality and desert asceticism, influential in both Catholic and Eastern Orthodox traditions, can help assuage the thirst of Korean Protestants exhausted by the excesses of positivity and the exploitation of self. I focus on the insatiable consuming passions of Korean Protestant religious consumerism as symptoms of the burnout society. I then explore the major contribution of apophatic spirituality and (...) desert asceticism, which have much to teach contemporary Korean Protestantism. (shrink)

Matti Eklund (2017) has argued that ardent realists face a serious dilemma. Ardent realists believe that there is a mind-independent fact as to which normative concepts we are to use. Eklund claims that the ardent realist cannot explain why this is so without plumping in favor of their own normative concepts or changing the topic. The paper first advances the discussion by clarifying two ways of understanding the question of which normative concepts to choose: a theoretical question about which concepts (...) have the abstract property of being normatively privileged and a further practical question of which concepts we are to choose even granting some concepts are thus privileged. I argue that the ardent realist’s best bet for answering the theoretical question while avoiding Eklund’s dilemma is to provide a real definition of this property. I point out the difficulties for providing such a definition. I then argue that even with an answer to the theoretical question, the ardent realist faces a further dilemma in answering the practical question. In sum, though I see no knock-down argument against ardent realism, it may nonetheless die a death by a thousand cuts. I close by considering a deeper reason for why ardent realism is so difficult to defend: every argument starts somewhere. It is unclear how there can be an Archimedean point that makes no reference to any normative concepts that can nonetheless be employed to convince everyone to adopt ours. I then briefly propose two options for someone still inclined towards realism: (i) accept that our normative concepts are normatively privileged without attempting to explain why this is so, or (ii) be less ardent and accept a perspective-dependent account of normativity. (shrink)

Collection of Buddha's teaching (Tib. Bkaʼ) translated into Tibetan (ʼgyur).

What distinguishes low, middle, and high art? In this article, I give an ameliorative analysis of these concepts. On what I call the Capacity View, the distinction between low, middle, and high art depends on the relation between an artwork’s perceiver (specifically her aesthetic responsive capacities) and the perceived artwork. Though the Capacity View may not align perfectly with folk usage, the view is worth our attention due to three attractive upshots. First, it explains how an artwork’s status level can (...) be elevated or lowered over time and why biases can lead to mistaken judgments about such statuses. Second, it sheds light on the idea of cultural inheritance and why certain forms of aesthetic deference may be justified. Finally, it explains how high, middle, and low art each make distinctive contributions to the good life. (shrink)

On correct method of understanding various Buddhist philosophical concepts according to sutras and tantras. (Dus gsum gyi rgyal ba sras dang bcas paʹi bstan pa mthaʼ dag dang kyad par Rdo-rje-ʼchang Karma-paʼi dgong pa gsal bar byed paʼi bstan bcos thar paʼi lam chen bgrod paʼi shing rta zhes bya ba ʼdi yin no).

Critical study on some important philosophical points of Buddhism and methods of cleansing social problems through Buddhist doctrines.

This is a comparative study of the discourses on the nature of sacred language found in Indian Abhidharma texts and their counterparts by seventh century Chinese Buddhist scholars who, unlike the Indian Buddhists, questioned "the essence of the Buddha's teaching," and developed intellectual dialogues through their texts. ;In the Indian Abhidharma texts, Sa ngitiparyaya, Jnanaprasthana, Mahavibhasa, Abhidharmakosa, and Nyayanusara, the nature of the Buddha's word was either "sound," the oral component of speech, or "name," the component of language that conveys (...) meaning, or both. I show that the Sautrantikas refused to accept the category of "name," which was abstract and hypothetical to them. However, the attitude of the opposing Sarvastivadins, attested in the Mahavibhasa, for whom "name" was approved in their ontological structure, was ambivalent. In the Abhidharmakosa, both positions were introduced without commentary. Sanghabhadra, an ardent Sarvastivadin, was the only one who explicitly claimed that "name" should be the nature of the Buddha's word. ;What was mainly a linguistic debate in India became transformed in China into a religious and metaphysical one. Chiao-t'i, "the essence of the Buddha's word," was used for the first time by Hsuan-tsang for buddhavacana, "the word of the Buddha" in Sanskrit. Adding the term "essence" altered the nature of the debate. Wonch'uk was the first to view the issue from the broad perspective of its history and provenance in the Indian Buddhist texts. K'uei-chi incorporated it into Yogacara: the Buddha's teaching is what is represented in sentient beings' minds. Fa-tsang defined the essence of the Buddha's teaching as the truth appearing in the mind of the Buddha, which he equated with the truth of the Hua-yen world, tathata. This gradual but candid process of dialogue on "the Buddha's word" preluded a transition to "Chinese" Buddhism. An inquiry no longer in the category of language or of epistemological investigation claims its own identity in the Chinese discussion querying the "essence" or "substance" of the Buddha's teaching, and even "Buddhism" itself, transcending the distinction between language and meaning. (shrink)

Commentary on Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu, a classical verse work on the Vaibhāṣika school in Buddhist philosophy.

The goal of the dissertation is, first, to develop in the tradition of conventional quantum mechanics what I call a propensity view of quantum properties, and to examine its coherence. Conventional quantum mechanics assumes the completeness of quantum mechanics. Taking the ontic version of the completeness assumption, which says that a state vector completely describes an individual quantum system as it is, I argue that the propensity view of quantum properties, i.e., the attribution of certain irreducible propensities to a quantum (...) system, is not only demanded but also can be coherently maintained. ;Second, I evaluate the relation between a propensity view of quantum properties and the demands of Einstein's program of realism, the backbone of which is the requirement that physical systems, as described by a theory, have properties independently of measurement. In doing so, I argue for a non-relational version of the quantum propensity view, which amounts to attributions propensities to individual quantum systems, and claim that conventional quantum mechanics together with the non-relational propensity view of quantum properties realizes physical realism, which is a particular version of Einstein's realist thesis and which reads that a physical system, as described by a theory, has at least some of its extrinsic properties independently of measurement. ;Third, quantum mechanics, in spite of its empirical success, has suffered from certain well-known conceptual puzzles, viz., the measurement problem and the problem of nonlocality as it arises in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. So we ask whether the propensity view of quantum properties can help us the resolve these problems. I argue that the so-called reduction of the wave packet is the source of both problems and suggest that there is a sense in which the propensity view of quantum properties explains the reduction of the wave packet and its nonlocal nature. On the other hand, the propensity view by itself fails to resolve the question of when or in what circumstances the reduction of the wave packet occurs, indicating that we do not as yet possess a complete understanding of quantum propensities. (shrink)

In the contemporary intellectual scene, one prominent question is this, what made science and its success possible? One tempting strategy for dealing with this question as a philosopher of science is to use science (or more broadly, empirical inquiry) and its methods to investigate the nature of science and its success. This strategy is what used to be called naturalism. For a philosopher of science, it amounts to naturalizing her philosophical inquiry for understanding the nature of science and its success. (...) The project of naturalizing philosophy of science has not been without its own problems. Some of the concerns are as follows. Willphilosophy of science maintain its traditional normative character after going through the process of naturalization? If it does, what form(s) will its normative content take? Can that normative content be secured without appealing to methods other than those usually used in empirical inquiries? In this essay, I will call these issues collectively the problem of normativity. First of all, I’ll look into the two most representative attempts to naturalize philosophy of science, namely L. Laudan’s and R. Giere’s attempts, focusing on the views that could be taken as their answers to the questions constituting the problem of normativity. Then I’ll examine these views in the light of some prominent criticisms and potential problems, and argue that some of those views could be defended by developing one or other additional conceptual arsenals but still others need to be curbed down admitting the apparent weaknesses of their supporting arguments. This reevaluative process will give us a better idea about what have been achieved by the attempts to naturalize philosophy of science and what their limitations are. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Holy Trinity in Ippolito Desideri's Ke ri se ste aṇ kyi chos lugs kyi snying poTrent PomplunOn April 10, 1716, Ippolito Desideri, a Jesuit who had but recently arrived in Tibet, wrote a long letter to another Jesuit missionary, Ildebrando Grassi, who was stationed in Mysuru, India. Desideri recounted his adventures since the two men had last been together, three and a half years earlier, at the Jesuit (...) residence in Goa. He told of his travels to Surat, Delhi, Lahore, Leh, and Lhasa, and recalled his first impressions of Tibetan religion and culture. Tibetans, he told Grassi, were gentle and docile, but coarse and uncultivated. In Desideri's opinion, they had neither arts nor sciences, but they did reject the doctrine of transmigration and appeared to have some knowledge of the Christian faith.1 "Here is what I learned about the Tibetans' religion," he wrote,They call God könchok (dkon mchog), and they appear to have some notion of the adorable Trinity, for at times they call Him könchok chik (dkon mchog gcig), that is, the One God, and at other times they call Him könchok sum (dkon mchog gsum), that is, the Triune God. They also use a kind of chaplet, over which they repeat the words Oṁ ah hūṁ, and they say that the word Oṁ signifies knowledge or an arm, that is, power; ah is the word, and hūṁ is the heart, or love, and that these three words mean God. They also worship a being named Padmasaṃbhava, who was born some seven hundred years ago. When asked if he were God or man, some people replied that he was both God and man, having neither father nor mother, but having been born from a flower. Even so, they have statues representing a woman with a flower in her hand, whom they call Padmasaṃbhava's mother, and they venerate several others whom they treat as saints. In their churches, one finds an altar covered with cloth and ornaments, and a sort of tabernacle sits in the middle of the altar, where they say Padmasaṃbhava dwells, though they also assert that he is in heaven.2This letter, which survives only in a French translation, is noteworthy if only because Ippolito Desideri would later repudiate almost everything he affirmed in it. In a matter of months, the Jesuit missionary would change his mind about Tibetans' capacities for art, for science, and for culture. He would also change his mind considerably about their religion. [End Page 117]Perhaps the most significant change—and one that would later play a large role in his legal battle with the Capuchins for control of the Tibetan mission—concerned the knowledge that Tibetans had of the Holy Trinity, the central Christian mystery that God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In what follows, I would like to explore Ippolito Desideri's explanation of the Holy Trinity, especially in the Ke ri se ste aṇ kyi chos lugs kyi snying po (The Essence of Christian Doctrine). I will briefly situate Desideri's account of Tibetans' knowledge of the Trinity in the general historical and theological context of the early modern missions, outline his various attempts to explain this central Christian mystery in Tibetan, and offer some tentative speculations on the Jesuit's motives for choosing certain Tibetan terms. I hope this discussion of Desideri's treatment of the Holy Trinity might contribute to Christian theologians and Buddhist philosophers who are engaged in interreligious dialogue and assist them in their reflections about how best to translate their respective faiths in such dialogue. Desideri's translations are not always perspicacious—as we shall see—but they are instructive, especially to the extent that they show us the issues that must be considered when anyone wishes to translate the basic terms of his own religion into an alien language. With this difficulty in mind, we might also consider the inadequacy of all language, human or angelic, when confronted with the mystery of God's infinite transcendence.Ippolito Desideri in ContextBefore addressing Desideri's translations, I would like to point out that the description of Tibetan religion... (shrink)

This This paper examines the acceptance and criticism of Zhuzi(朱子)’s Zhonghe(中和) theory in the Choseon Jingxue(經學) of the 16th and 17th Centuries. In order to discuss the Zhuzi(朱子)’s Zhonghe(中和) theory, I first thought that the conceptual analysis of Doctrine of the Mean(中庸) is necessary for the ‘喜怒哀樂之未發謂之中, 發而皆中節謂之和’. As a result of this analysis, it was confirmed that the concept of Zhonghe(中和) of Doctrine of the Mean(中庸) was basically a matter of feeling. This indicates that the Zhonghe(中和) idea of Doctrine (...) of the Mean(中庸) takes the issue of feeling more important than reason. This point can be understood as a dimension of the same context in that Western thought emphasizes reason and Eastern thought emphasizes emotion. It is judged that the Zhonghe(中和) idea of Doctrine of the Mean(中庸) centering on this feeling of appreciation has led to the time of the Lijizhushu(禮記注疏). This Zhonghe(中和) thought based on emotion of Doctrine of the Mean(中庸) is newly interpreted by the Cheng-Zhu School(程朱學). Especially, the recognition of ‘Zhong(中)’ in the Weifa(未發) as Li(理) can be called a great change in the mind-nature theory(心性論) of Doctrine of the Mean(中庸). This interpretation of Zhonghe(中和) was largely accepted in the 16th and 17th century Choseon Dynasty, and the representative character is Cho Ik(趙翼). On the other hand, there was also a person who did not accept this interpretation of Zhonghe(中和) as it was. The representative figure is Park Sedang. Park Sedang was unable to accept Zhu Xi’s philosophical interpretation of Weifa(未發) in his perception of Zhonghe(中和) theory. He recognized that in human mind there could hardly be a state of Weifa(未發) in which a glimmer of thought does not arise. This is why he did not accept Zhu xi’s philosophical interpretation of considering the state of 'Weifa(未發) as ‘Jiran-Budong(寂然不動)’. I think that Park Sedang's view on Zhonghe(中和) is closer to the previous Zhonghe theory(中和舊說) of Zhu Xi. (shrink)

The Tibetan Buddhist logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge devoted a large part of his discussion on argumentation to arguments by consequence. Phya pa distinguishes in his analysis arguments by consequence that merely refute the opponent and arguments by consequence that qualify as probative. The latter induce a correct direct proof which corresponds to the reverse form of the argument by consequence. This paper deals with Phya pa’s classification of probative consequences based on the type of the logical reason (...) involved. I first establish the basis of Phya pa’s classification—the typology of logical reasons in inference-for-oneself—with a special attention to logical reasons consisting in the ‘apprehension of something incompatible [with the negandum]’ and among them the specific case of the ‘apprehension of the cause of something incompatible [with the negandum]’. The treatment of the latter is shown to be instrumental in Phya pa’s classification, as well as in explaining the divergences that occur in the models adopted by his successors, such as gTsang nag pa brTson ʾgrus seng ge and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge. Turning to Phya pa’s effective application of this typology when he resorts himself to arguments by consequence, I examine Phya pa’s rephrasing, in the form of four arguments by consequence, of the discussion on the relation between the two realities found in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and relate it to a parallel discussion in an earlier Madhyamaka work by rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags. I compare the variant versions of these four arguments in three Madhyamaka works of Phya pa and show that the differences pertaining to the identification of the type of the logical reason result from apparently insignificant variations in the formulation of each of the arguments. In the conclusion, I discuss the potential philosophical or practical interest of such a classification. (shrink)